parameters have values typical of, say, any warmS moist air mass found in spring and summer in the central United States, with a single exceptionS a quantity K called circulation which is a measure of the general rotation of the air in which the tornado is imbedded. This quantity has been estimated with great accuracy for at least one tornado, and I think we know very closely its value in the typical case. It corresponds, however, to so great a rotation that it is obviously a very rare occurrence. This may explain the infreparameters have values typical of, say, any warmS moist air mass found in spring and summer in the central United States, with a single exceptionS a quantity K called circulation which is a measure of the general rotation of the air in which the tornado is imbedded. This quantity has been estimated with great accuracy for at least one tornado, and I think we know very closely its value in the typical case. It corresponds, however, to so great a rotation that it is obviously a very rare occurrence. This may explain the infrequency of tornadoes. It is possible that we could learn to predict this (parent) small-scale cyclone, and this in turn could lead to better forecasting of tornadoes. quency of tornadoes. It is possible that we could learn to predict this (parent) small-scale cyclone, and this in turn could lead to better forecasting of tornadoes. 7 mammalian reproduction, where the moment of birth, of exposure to the external world of becoming a fully legal entityy takes place long after the moment of conception. With respect to the principle here discussed, the lerlgth of the gestation period is a matter of controversy: 10 years, 12 years, 18 years,, 40 years, or about 100 yearss depending on whorn one takes to be the father of the child.
Statement of the Principle
For reasons given below, I here refer to the prlnciple by a name already introduced (2) -namely, the '4competi-tive exclusion principle," or more briefly, the "exclusion principle.' It may be briefly stated thus: Complete competators cannot coexist Many published discussions of the-principle revolve around the ambiguity of the words used in stating it. The statement given above has beexl very carefully constructed: earery one of the four words is ambiguous. This formulation has mammalian reproduction, where the moment of birth, of exposure to the external world of becoming a fully legal entityy takes place long after the moment of conception. With respect to the principle here discussed, the lerlgth of the gestation period is a matter of controversy: 10 years, 12 years, 18 years,, 40 years, or about 100 yearss depending on whorn one takes to be the father of the child.
For reasons given below, I here refer to the prlnciple by a name already introduced (2) -namely, the '4competi-tive exclusion principle," or more briefly, the "exclusion principle. ' small competitive difference will result iIl a-rapid -extermination of the less successful species. Competitive diSerences that are so small as to be unmeasurable by direct means will, by virtue of the compound-interest effectS ultimately result in the extinction of one competing species by another.'
The Qllestion of Evidence So much for the theory Is it true? This sounds like a straightforward questione but it hides subtleties that haveS unfortunatelyS escaped a good many of the ecologists who have done their bit to make the exclusion principle a matter of dispute. There are many who lhave supposed that the principle is one that can be proved or disproved by empirical facts among them (9, 10) Gause himself. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The "truth' of the principIe is and can be established only by theory, not being subject to proof or disproof by facts, as ordinarily understood. Perhaps this statement shocks you. Let me explain.
Suppose you believe the principle is true and set out to prove it empirically. 3First you find two noninterbreeding species that seem to have the same ecological characteristics. You bring them together in the same geographic location and await developments. What happens? -Either one species extinguishes the other or they coexist. If the formerS you say, "The principle is proved.v But if the species continue to coexist indefinitely, do you conclude the principle is false? Not at all. You decide there must have been some subtle diflTerence in the ecology of the species that escaped you at firstS so you look at the species again to try to see how they diSer ecologically, all the while retaining your belief in the exclusion principle. As Gilbert, Reynoldson, and Hobart (10) dryly remarked, "There is . . . a danger of a circular process here...."
Indeed there is. Yet the procedure can be justified both empirically and theoretically. fF;irst, empirically. On this point our argument is essentially an acknowledgement of ignorance. When we think of mixing two similar species that have previously lived apartw we realize that it is hardly possible to know enough about species to be able to say, in advance, which one will exclude the other in free competition. C)rS as Darwin, at the close of chapter 4 of his Origin of Species (11) Lack, 1945) . Moreover, the discovery . . . that the beak differences serve as recognition marks, provided quite a different reason for their existence, and thus strengthened the view that any associated differences in diet are purely incidental and of no particular importance.
"My views have now completely changed, through appreciating the force of Gause's contention that two species with similar ecology cannot live in the same region (Gause, 1934 ). This is a simple consequence of natural selection. If two species of birds occur together in the same habitat in the same region, eat the same types of food and have the same other ecological requirements, then they should compete with each other, and since the chance of their being equally well adapted is negligible, one of them should eliminate the other completely. Nevertheless, three sE>ecies of ground finch live together in the same habitat on the same Galapagos islands, and this also applies to two species of insectivorous tree-finch. There must be xome factor which prevents these species from effectively competing." Implicit in this passage is a bit of warm and interesting autobiography. It is touching to see how intellectual gratitude led Lack to name the exclusion principle after Gause, calling it, in successive publications, "Gause's contention,' "Gauses hypothesis," and "Gause's principle." But the eponymy is scarcely justified. As Gilbert, Reynoldson, and Hobart point out (10, p. 3 12): "Gause . . . draws no general conclusions from his experiinents, and moreover, makes no statement which resembles any wording of the hypothesis which has arisen bearing his name." Moreover, in the very publication in which he discussed the principle, Gause acknowledged the priority of Lotka in 1932 (5) and Volterra in 1926 (6). Gause gave full credit to these men, viewing his own work merely as an empirical testing of their theory-a quite erroneous view, as we have seen. How curious it is that the principle should be named after a man who did not state it clearly, who misapprehended its relation to theory, and who acknowledged the priority of others! Recently Udvardy (19) , in an admirably compact note, has pointed out that Joseph Grinnell, in a number of publications, expressed the exclusion principle with considerable clarity. In the earliest passage that Udvardy found, Grinnell, in 1904 (20) said: "Every animal tends to increase at a geometric ratio, and is checked only by limit of food supply. It is only by adaptations to diSerent sorts of food, or modes of food getting, that more than one species can occupy the same locality. Two species of approximately the same food habits are not likely to remain long enough evenly balanced in numbers in the same region. One will crowd out the other."
Udvardy quotes from several subsequent publications of Grinnell, from all of which it is quite clear that this well-known naturalist had a much better grasp of the exclusion principle than did Gause. Is this fact, however, a sufflciently good reason for now speaking (as Udvardy recommends) cff 'sGrinnell's axiom?" On the basis of present evidence there seems to be justice in the proposal, but we must remember that the principle has already been referred to, in various publications, as s'Gause's principle," the "Volterra-Gause principle," and the "LotkaVolterra principle." What assurance have we that some diligent scholar will not tomorrow unearth a predecessor of Grinnell? And if this happens, should we then replace Grinnell's name with another's? Or should we, in a fine show of fairness, use all the names? (According to this system, the principle would, at present, be called the Grinnell-Volterra-Lotka-Gause-Lack principle and, even so, injustice would be done to A. J. Nicholson, who, in his wonderful gold mine of unexploited aphorisms (15) , wrote: "For the steady state [in the coexistence of two or more species] to exist, each species must possess some advantage over all other species with respect to some one, or group, of the control factors to which it is subject." This is surely a corollary of the exclusion principle.)
In sum, I think we may say that arguments for pinning an eponym on this idea are unsound. But it does need a name of some sort; its lack of one has been one of the reasons (though not the only one) why this basic principle has trickled out of the scientific con-sciousness after each mention during the last half century. Like Allee et al. (21) we should wish "to avoid further implementation of the facetious denition of ecology as being that phase of biology primarily abandoned to terminology.' But, on the other side, it has been pointed out (22): ';Not many recorded facts are lost; the bibliographic apparatus of science is fairly equal to the problem of recording melting points, indices of refraction, etc., in such a way that they can be recalled when needed. Ideas, more subtie and more diSusely expressed present a bibliographic problem to which there is no present solution." To solve the bibliographic problem some sort of handle is needed for the idea here discussed; the name "the competitive exclusion principle" is correctly descriptive and will not be made obsolete by future library research.
The Exclllsion Principle and Darwin
In our search for early statements of the principle we must not pass by the writings of Charles Darwin, who had so keen an appreciation of the ecological relationships of organisms. I have been unable to find any unambiguous references to the exclusion principle in the '4Essays' of 1842 and 1844 (23) but in the Origin itself there are several passages that deserve recording. All the following passages are quoted from the sixth edition (11) .
';As the species of the same genus usually have, though by no means invariably, much similarity in habits and constitution, and always in structure, the struggle will generally be more severe between them, if they come into competition with each other, than between the species of distinct genera. We see this in the recent extension over parts of the United States of one species of swallow having caused the decrease of another species. The recent increase of the missel-thrush in parts of Scotland has caused the decrease of the song-thrush. How frequently we hear of one species of rat taking the place of another species under the most diSerent climates! In Russia the small Asiatic cockroach has everywhere driven before it its great congener. In Australia the imported hivebee is rapidly exterminating the small, stingless native bee. One species of charlock has been known to supplant another species; and so in other cases. We can dimly see why the competition 29 APRIL 1960 should be most severe between allied forms, which fill nearly the same place in the economy of nature, but probably in no one case could we precisely say why one species has been victorious over another in the great battle of life" (p. 71).
"Owing to the high geometrical rate of increase of all organic beings, each area is already fully stocked with inhabitants; and it follows from this, that as the favored forms increase in number, so, generally, will the less favored decrease and become rare Rarity, as geology tells us, is the precursor to extinction. We can see that any form which is represented by few -individuals will run a good chance of utter extinction, during great fluctuations in the nature or the seasons, or from a temporary increase in the number of its enemies. But we may go further than this; for, as new forms are produced, unless we admit that specific forms can go on indefinitely increasing in number, many old forms must become extinct" (p. 102).
;;From these several considerations I think it inevitably follows, that as new species in the course of time are formed through natural selection, others will become rarer and rarer, and finally extinct. The forms which stand in closest competition with those undergoing modification and improvement, will naturally sufEer most. And we have seen in the chapter on the Struggle for Existence that it is the most closely-allied forms-varieties of the same species, and species of the same genus or related genera which, from having nearly the same structure, constitution and habits, generally come into the severest competition with each other consequently, each new variety or species, during the progress of its formation, will generally press hardest on its nearest kindred, and tend to exterminate them. We see the same process of extermination among our domesticated productions, through the selection of improved forms by man. Many curious instances could be given showing how quickly new breeds of cattle, sheep and other animals, and varieties of flowers, take the place of older and inferior kinds. In Yorkshire, it is historically known that the ancient black cattle were displaced by the longhorns, and that these 'were swept away by the short-horns (I quote the words of an agricultural writer) 'as if by some murderous pestilence' " (p. 103).
"For it should be remembered that the competition will generally be most severe between those forms which are most nearly related to each other in habits, constitution and structure. Hence all the intermediate forms between the earlier and later states, that is between the less and more improved states of the same species, as well as the original parent species itself, will generally tend to become extinct" (p. 1 14) .
Those passages are, we must admitR typically Darwinian; by turn ciear, obscure, explicit, cryptic, suggestive, they have in them all the characteristics that litterateurs seek in James Joyce. The complexity of Darwin's work, however, is unintended; it is the result epartly of his limitations as an analytical thinker, but in part also it is the consequence of the magnitude, importanceS and intrinsic difficulty of the ideas he grappled with. Darwin was not one to impose premature clarity on his writings.
Origins in Economic Theory?
In chapter 3 of Nature and Man's Fate I have argued for the correctness of John Maynard Keynes' view that the biological principle of naturaT selection is just a vast generalization of Ricardian economics. The argument is based on the isomorphism of theoretical systems in the two fields of human thought. Now that we have at last brought the competitive exclusion principle out of the periphery of our visior} into focus on the fovea centralis it is natural to wonder if this principle, tooS originated in economic thought. I think it is possible. At any rate, there is a passage by the French mathematician J. Bertrand (24) , published in 1883 which shows an appreciation of the exclusion principle as it applies to economic matters. The passage occurs in a review of a book of Cournot, published much earlierS in which Cournot discussed the outcome of a struggle between two merchants engaged in selling identical products to the public. Bertrand says: "Their interest would be to unite or at least to agree on a common price so as to extract from the body of customers the greatest possible receipts. But this solution is avoided by Cournot who supposes that one of the competitors will lower his price in order to attract the buyers to himselfS and that the other, trying to regain them, will set his price still lower. The two rivals wlll cease to pursue this path only when each has nothing more to gain by lowering his price.
"To this argument we make a peremptory objection. Given the hypothesis, no solution is possible: there is no limit to the lowering of the price. Much of the theory of ecology fits Scriven's description of evolutionary theory. Told that two formerly separated species are to be introduced into the same environment and asked to predict exactly what will happen, we are generally unable to do so. We can only make certaisl predictions of this sort: either A will extinguish B, or B will extinguish A; or the two species 1296 are (or must become) ecologically different-that is, they must come to occupy different ecological niches. The general rule may be stated in either of two diflerent ways: Complete competitors cannot coexist-as was said earlier; or, Ecological digerentiation is the necessary condition for coexistence.
It takes little imagination to see that the exclusion principle, to date stated explicitly only in ecological literature, has applications in many academic fields of study. I shall now point out some of these, showing how the principle has been used (mostly unconsciously) in the past, and predicting some of its applications in the future.
Economics. The principle unquestionably plays an indispensable role in almost all economic thinking, though it is seldom explicitly stated. Any competitor knows that unrestrained competition will ultimatelyC result in but one victor. If he is confident that he is that one, he may plump for "rugged individualism.ss If, on the other hand, he has doubts, then he will seek to restrain or restrict competition. He can restrain it by forming a cartel with his competitors, or by maneuvering the passage of "fair trade?' laws. (Laboring men achieve a similar end though the problem is somewhat different-by the formation of unions and the passage of minimum wage laws.) Or he may restrict competition by "ecological diSerentiation," by putting out a slightly diSerent product (aided by restrictive patent and copyright laws). All this may be regarded as individualistic action.
Society as a whole may take action. The end of unrestricted competition is a monopoly. It is well known that monopoly breeds power which acts to insure and extend the monopoly; the system has "positive feedback' and hence is always a threat to those aspects of society still "outside" the monopoly. For this reason, men may, in the interest of "society" (rather than of themselves as individual competitors), band together to insure continued competition; this they do by passing antimonopoly laws which prevent competition from proceeding to its ';naturally" inevitable conclusion. Or "society" may permit monopolies but seek to remove the power element by the "socialization" of the monopoly (expropriation or regulation).
In their actions both as individuals and as groups, men show that they have an implicit understanding of the exclusion principle. But the failure to bring this understanding to the level of consciousness has undoubtedly contributed to the accusations of bad faith ("exploiter of the masses," "profiteer," "nihilist," "communist'>) that have characterized many of the interchanges between competing groups of society during the last century. F. A. Lange (27) , thinking only of laboring men, spoke in most Ieervent terms of the necessity of waging a "struggle against the struggle for existence"-that is, a struggle against the unimpeded working out of the exclusion principle. Groups with interests opposed to those of "labor" are equally passionate about the same cause, though the examples they have in mind are diSerent.
At the present time, one of the great fields of economics in which the application of the exclusion principle is resisted is international competition (nonbellicose). For emotional reasons, most discussion of problems in this field is restricted by the assumption (largely implicit) that Cournot's solution of the intranational competition problem is correct and applicable to the international problem. On the less frequent occasions when it is recognized that Bertrand's, not Cournot's, reasoning is correct, it is assumed that the consequences of the exclusion principle can be indefinitely postponed by a rapid and endless multiplication of '4ecologi-cal niches" (largely unprotected though they are by copyright and patent). If some of these assumptions prove to be unrealistic, the presently fashionable stance toward tariffs and other restrictions of international competition will have to be modified.
Genetics. The application of the exclusion principle to genetics is direct and undeniable. The system of discrete alleles at the same gene locus competing for existence within a single population of organisms is perfectly isomorphic with the system of diSerent species of organisms competing for existence in the same habitat and ecological niche. The consequences of this have frequently been acknowledged, usually implicitly, at least since J. B. S. Haldane's work of 1924 (28). But in this field, also, the consequences have often been denied, explicitly or otherwise, and-again for emotional reasons. The denial has most often been coupled with a "denial' (in the psychological sense) of the priority of the inequality axiom. As a result of recent findings in the fields of physiological more bit of evidence that he appreciated the exclusion principle-"We need not marvel at extinction; if we must marvel, let it be at our own presumption in imagining for a moment that we understand the many complex contingencies on which the existence of each species depends." I think it is not too much to say that in the history of ecology which in the broadest sense includes the science of economics and the study of population genetics we stand at the threshold of a renaissance of understanding, a renaissance made possible by the explicit acceptance of the competitive exclusion principle. This principle, like much of the essential theory of evolution, has (I think) long been psychologically denied, as the penetrating study of Morse Peckham (31) indicates. The reason for the denial is the usual one: admission of the principle to conciousness is painful.
[Evidence for such an assertion is, in the nature of the case, diEcult to find, but for a single clear-cut example see the letter by Krogman (32) .] It is not sadism or masochism that makes us urge that the denial be brought to an end. Rather, it is a love of the reality principle, and recognition that only those truths that aft admitted to the conscious mind are available for use in making sense of the world. To assert the truth of the competitive exclusion principle is not to say that nature is and always must be, everywhere, "red in tooth and claw." Rather, it is to point out that every instance of apparent coexistence must be accounted for. Out of the study of all such instances will come a fuller knowledge of the many prosthetic devices of coexistence, each with its own costs and its own benefits. On such a foundation we may set about the task of establish-* mg a sclence ot ecologlca englneerlng. genetics and population genetics, particularly as concerns blood groups, the applicability of both the inequality axiom and the exclusion principle is rapidly becoming accepted. William C. Boyd has recorded, in a dramatic way (29), his escape from the bondage of psychological denial. The emotional restrictions of rational discussion in this field are immense. How "the struggle against the struggle for existence" will be waged in the field of human genetics promises to make the next decade of study one of the most exciting of man's attempts to accept the implications of scientific knowledge.
Ecology. Once one has absorbed the competitive exclusion principle into one's thinking it is curious to note how one of the most popular problems of evolutionary speculation is turned 1lpside down. Probably most people, when first taking in the picture of historical evolution, are astounded at the number of species of plants and animals that have become extinct. From Simpson's gallant"guesstimates" (30), it would appear that from 99 to 99.975 percent of all species evolved are now extinct, the larger percentage corresponding to 3999 million species. This seems like a lot. Yet it is even more remarkable that there should live at any one time (for exampleS the present) as many as a million species, more or less competing with each other. Competition is avoided between some of the species that coexist in time by separation in space. In addition, however, there are many ecologically more or less similar species that coexist. Their continued existence is a thing to wonder at and to study. As Darwin said (11, p. 363) and this is one 29 APRIL 1960 1297
